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TRADEMARK LICENSING AGREEMENTS IN LIGHT OF 
THE EC COMPETITION RULES
Resumen: Uno de los problemas que plantean los contratos de li-
cencia de marcas es la conciliación del interés de los contratantes con el 
Derecho de la competencia. Por un lado, es preciso garantizar a las partes 
la más amplia libertad contractual, al mismo tiempo que, no obstante, 
debe preservarse, por otro, la libre competencia en el mercado. El pre-
sente artículo constituye una aproximación al régimen de los contratos 
de licencia en dicho contexto, en el que la clave es encontrar el balance 
adecuado entre los legítimos intereses de los titulares de derechos sobre 
marcas y la protección de la competencia leal, dos conceptos que se com-
plementan uno a otro y que constituyen elemento indispensable del mer-
cado común Europeo.
Palabras clave: Contratos de licencia de marcas, Cláusulas contrac-
tuales individuales, Prohibición del art. 81(1) Tratado CEE, Cláusulas 
tie-in, licencia exclusiva.
Abstract: Licensing of trademarks is one of the areas where interests 
of trademark holders and competition rules overlap. On the one side, 
there is a need to guarantee to the parties the broadest possible freedom 
in shaping the licensing contract, on the other again, protection of other 
traders and of undistorted competition in the market remains the mat-
ter of concern for European authorities. The present paper provides an 
overview of the rules relating to trademark licensing agreements, as they 
were developed by the European institutions and shaped according to 
requirements of the EU competition law. It is to highlight the search for 
the right balance between legitimate interests of trademark holders and 
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protection of fair competition, the two concepts which complement 
each other and which constitute an indispensable element of the Com-
mon Market.
Keywords: Trademark licensing agreements, Individual contractual 
clauses, Prohibition of art. 81(1) EEC Treaty, Tie-in clauses
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“The exercise of trade mark rights is particularly liable to contribute to the division 
of markets and therefore to prejudice the free movement of goods between States which 
is essential for the Common Market. Trade mark rights are distinguished from other 
industrial and commercial property rights in so far as the object of the latter is often more 
important and worthy of greater protection than the former.”
(Sirena S.R.L. v. Eda S.R.L., Case 40/70, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260).
“Trade mark rights constitute an essential element of the system of undistorted 
competition which the EEC Treaty aims to establish and maintain.”
(S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, Case C-10/89, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571).
Introduction
As pointed out by G. F. Henderson ‘[t]rade marks law is not as te-
chnically or scientifically complex as patent law. It is not as trendy and 
glamorous as copyright law. However, it is, in many respects, the oldest, 
most pervasive, most legally complex, erudite and commercially impor-
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tant area of intellectual property law’1. It has not been such a long time 
since these words were expressed by a distinguished Canadian scholar 
and it would be right to say that some things have already changed. For 
example, the object of trademark law in fact becomes more and more 
‘trendy’ and sometimes also ‘glamorous’. Let’s take a case of fashion in-
dustry where trademarks very often constitute a core around which the 
growth of success of the holder of a mark and products it covers can 
smoothly continue. Not only that, trademarks have bravely surpassed the 
role and functions which have been traditionally assigned to them, na-
mely from indicators of origins of goods, the guarantee of their constant 
quality and instruments which help consumers in their market choices, 
trademarks became signs that very often constitute commercial as well 
as cultural icons and that frequently represent the image which people 
wish to acquire and share. Then, there is no doubt today that trademarks 
have their role in transfer of new technologies and expansion of innova-
tions in all fields, this particularly takes place when these technologies 
are sold or licensed together with trademark assignment or trademark 
licence respectively.
It is interesting to note, however, that the way to arrive up to this 
point was long and not always easy for trademarks. Still, few decades 
ago the Community law traditionally perceived intellectual property 
rights as a threat to market integration; consequently, free movement 
of goods and competition rules were designed to limit the partitioning 
of the market caused, among others, by intellectual property rights.2 It 
is not until relatively recently, that IP rights were recognized as impor-
tant factors contributing to innovation and consumers’ benefits. What 
is extremely important, is the acknowledgment by the European judicial 
authorities that intellectual property rights do not create by themselves 
unfair market power for their holders, and as a result that such rights are 
not inherently anticompetitive.
Trademarks, as conferring for their holders exclusive rights, have of-
ten been accused of creating unfair monopolies. ‘Monopoly’ can be defi-
ned as the right to exclude others from the use of a particular resource, for 
instance from the use of a specific symbol as a trademark.3 But the truth 
1 G. F. HENDERSON, ‘An Overview of Intellectual Property’ in G. F. HENDERSON, ed., Trade-
Marks Law of Canada (Carswell, Thomson Professional Publishing, 1993) 1, at 3. 
2 A. REINDL, ‘Intellectual Property and Intra-Community Trade’ (1997) 20 Fordham International 
Law Journal 819 [hereinafter: Reindl].
3 C.D.G. PICKERING, Trade Marks in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), at 74 
[hereinafter: Pickering]. 
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is that without such a monopoly conferred to trademarks, they could 
not meet any of their functions.4 As rightly observed by a distinguished 
specialist in the area, industrial property in fact does not grant a mono-
poly to its owner, but only exclusive rights.5 The distinction between the-
se two notions clearly explains the core of the issue. As the cited author 
specifies, exclusive rights, unlike monopoly, do not protect the owner 
from competition by substitute products6 and therefore do not hinder 
legitimate market competition. To the contrary, if properly protected, 
trademarks due to their functions constitute an important element of an 
effective competition system. In that respect it is right to say, as R. Joliet 
points out, that competition law and trademark law do not conflict, but 
complement each other.7 Nevertheless, it does not mean - the referred 
author continues - that trademark arrangements have never served to im-
plement anti-competitive measures. It is therefore important to find the 
proper balance between these two concepts: guarantee of undistorted 
competition and legitimate protection of trademarks’ owners. 
Licensing of trademarks is one of the areas where interests of tra-
demark holders and competition rules overlap. On the one side, there 
is a need to guarantee to the parties the broadest possible freedom in 
shaping the licensing contract, on the other again, protection of other 
traders and of undistorted competition in the market remains the matter 
of concern for European authorities. 
The present paper provides a brief overview of the rules relating to 
trademark licensing agreements, as they were developed by the European 
institutions and shaped according to requirements of the EU competi-
tion law. It is to highlight the search for the right balance between legiti-
mate interests of trademark holders and protection of fair competition, 
the two concepts which complement each other and which constitute 
an indispensable element of the Common Market.
4 A. KAMPERMAN, ‘A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality’ (1993) 11 
EIPR 406, at 411 [hereinafter: Kamperman].
5 H. ULLRICH, ‘Patents and Know-How, Free Trade, Interenterprise Cooperation and Competition 
Within the Internal European Market’ (1992) 23 IIC 583, at 603 [hereinafter: Ullrich].
6 Ibidem, at 604.
7 R. JOLIET, ‘Trademark Licensing Agreements Under the EEC Law of Competition’ (1983) 5 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 755, at 762 [hereinafter: Joliet].
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Part I
1. The notion of trademark licensing agreements and their uses
1.1. Definition of trademark licensing agreements
Intellectual property rights bestow upon their holders exclusivity 
with respect to their use, advertising, sale, etc. However, holders of these 
rights very often are not able to make the fullest possible use of them, and 
thus they decide to transfer their privilege to others. As pointed out in 
the literature, the ability of the owner of any intellectual property right 
to exploit it commercially is one of the chief attributes of such rights.8 
The transfer of an intellectual property right can take a form of a sale (as-
signment) or a license. Licensing of IP rights significantly contributes to 
the development and greater availability of products and consequently 
to consumers’ benefits. Nevertheless, in order to fulfil these functions, 
the transfer of IP rights must observe certain rules which protect not 
only the owner, but also the rights in question. 
It was observed that trademark licensing has relatively recent ori-
gin.9 The reason can be found in the original function of trademarks, 
i.e. indication of origin, which was to ensure that goods coming from 
another source could not carry an owner’s mark.10 The modern approach 
to IP rights is able to overcome the traditional concern that shared use 
of a trademark would amount to accepting confusion about the source 
of goods, such compromise could be reached through legal approval of 
‘coexistence agreements’ between the right holder and third parties.11 
To reconcile the apparent contradiction between the basic function of 
trademarks and economic as well as social importance of licensing, it is 
necessary to grant to the owner the possibility of control over the use 
of the trademark by the licensee, especially with regard to the quality 
of goods and marketing conditions.12 In addition, European trademark 
law provides a possibility for trademark owner to sue his licensee for tra-
demark infringement if he breaks provision of the agreement relating 
8 R. ANNAUD & H. NORMAN, Guide to the Community Trade Mark (Blackstone Press Limited, 
1998), at 236 [hereinafter: Annaud & Norman]. 
9 Introduction to Intellectual Property. Theory and Practice, Ed. World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (Geneva, Kluwer Law International, 1997), at 86 [hereinafter: Introduction to Intellectual Prop-
erty…].
10 Ibidem.
11 G. GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition Law. The Innovation Nexus (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA, 2006), at 102-103.
12 Introduction to Intellectual Property…, s. 216-217.
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to its duration, the form of the mark, the scope of goods and services 
covered by the licence, the affixed territory as well as the quality of goods 
and services (art. 8(2) of the harmonization directive).13 The commercial 
practice shows that trademark licensing agreements are commonly used 
in business sectors such as beer, soft drinks, aperitifs, chocolates, cigaret-
tes or clothing.14
It is useful to start the analysis by determining what trademark li-
censing agreements are. The definition presented by R. Joliet properly 
characterizes such arrangements. He refers to trademark licences as to 
‘contractual arrangements whereby a trademark owner permits another 
to use his trademark where, but for the licence, the other would be trade-
mark infringer’.15 In his further explanation, the author points out that 
the owner of a trademark who grants a licence makes a promise to the 
licensee not to sue him for trademark infringement in case the licensee 
sells, under a given trademark, products which he himself manufactures, 
assembles, processes or completes.16 Then, W.R. Cornish indicates that a 
licence to use a registered mark does not confer any proprietary interest 
on the part of the licensee, but it only allows him to use it, at the same 
time preventing the owner from any allegation of infringement.17
For a clear picture of the discussed matter it is important to make 
a distinction between trademark licensing agreements and distribution 
agreements. The latter category are arrangements under which a legal en-
tity, distinct from the trademark owner, has a right to resell the finished 
trademarked products. There may be certain doubts as to whether bo-
ttling, canning or repackaging are stages of the production process and 
by the same token they require the authorization from the trademark 
holder, or whether they fall within the distributor’s rights. It seems that 
rebottling or repackaging, considered as a completion process, need an 
express authorisation (in the form of a licence) of trademark holder18. 
However, under certain conditions repackaging or relabelling may be 
allowed (namely in situations where the repackaging is not to affect the 
original condition of the product, or if it does not cause the damage to 
the reputation of the trademark, where the importer gave a prior notice 
13 G. TRITTON, Intellectual Property in Europe, 2nd ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at 3-
157.
14 JOLIET, op. cit., at 758.
15 Ibidem, at 765.
16 Ibidem.
17 W. R. CORNISH, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 3rd Ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), at 580 [hereinafter: Cornish]. 
18 JOLIET, op. cit., at 766.
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to the trademark owner, and the new packaging clearly states who is res-
ponsible for repackaging).19
Conclusion of the licence agreement is one of the ways through whi-
ch trademark holder can exercise his rights. It enables him not only to set 
the limits of the use of his rights by other entities, but also to control such 
use. Nonetheless, although trademark licensing falls within the domain 
of freedom of contract, it is governed as well by the European Union 
rules on competition and free movement of goods. As a consequence, 
every such agreement must respect the relevant provisions of the EC 
legislation (i.e. art. 81, 82 EC Treaty). The reason for competition law 
capturing into its realm licensing of IP rights is that restrictive terms of a 
licence may give rise to creating dominant position, segmenting markets 
geographically and hindering objectives of the single market.20 While 
the owner of an exclusive, intellectual property right deserves protec-
tion as regards its individual exploitation, the contractual exploitation of 
such right is of a different status, because resulting in a shared exclusivity 
it may have an impact on competition in the market.21
1.2. EC Trademark licensing provisions
Under European law, the rules relating to trademarks are provided 
within the framework of two acts. One of them is the First Council Di-
rective of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States 
relating to trade marks (89/104/EEC)22, which aims at harmonizing tra-
demark legislation in national systems. Another, the Council Regulation 
No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark23, introdu-
ced a uniform regime for registration and protection of trademarks wi-
thin the European Union. National trademark systems  of the Member 
States and the Community trademark regime function in parallel and 
remain independent.
Both acts contain provisions on trademark licensing (art. 8 – trade-
mark harmonization directive, art 22 – Community trademark regula-
tion). Both acknowledge, that a trademark may be licensed ‘for some or 
19 P. WALSH, P. TREACY & T. FEASTER, ‘The Exhaustion and Unauthorised Exploitation of 
Trade Mark Rights in the European Union’ (1999) 24 E. L. Rev. 259, at 262-263 [hereinafter: Walsh, 
Treacy & Feaster]. 
20 M.M. DABBAH, EC and UK Competition Law. Commentary, Cases and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), at 211 [hereinafter: Dabbah].
21 ULLRICH, op. cit., at 604-605.
22 O.J. L 40, 11/02/1989, p. 1 [hereinafter: Trademark Directive].
23 O.J. L 11, 14/01/1994, p. 1 [hereinafter: Community Trademark Regulation].
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all of the goods or services for which it is registered’ and respectively ‘for 
the whole or part of the Member State concerned’ or ‘for the whole or 
part of the Community’. In addition, the European legislator expressly 
provides that a licence can be exclusive or non-exclusive. 
1.3. Other trademark agreements - mention
Apart from licensing contracts, there are other kinds of arrange-
ments leading to exploitation of industrial property rights by parties 
other than its first owner. First, such rights may be assigned to third par-
ties. A transfer of ownership of a trademark may be total or partial; it can 
be done in respect of some or all of the goods or services for which the 
mark is registered. Moreover, holders of trademark rights may enter into 
delimitation agreements with each other, on behalf of which they decide 
about the manner and the extent to which each of them will use specific 
trademarks. Such delimitation arrangements constitute a way to settle a 
dispute regarding the entitlement of each party to use a particular mark 
or particular marks.24 It is frequent in arrangements aiming at the settle-
ment of intellectual property litigation, that one party is granted some 
form of a licence to continue its prior activities (up to that time: perhaps 
infringing).25 The rationale for concluding such contracts lies in their 
purpose to bring to an end the confusion or conflict between particular 
trademarks. 
These agreements, although having basically different functions 
from licensing arrangement, may possess some similar features and simi-
larly fall within the provisions protecting competition.
1.4. Relevant competition law provisions
The present analysis requires a brief look into certain aspects of the 
provision of article 81 EC Treaty, in order to assess to what extent tra-
demark licensing agreements may fall within its scope. Art. 81(1) prohi-
bits ‘all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market’.
24 E. McKNIGHT, ‘Trade Mark Agreements and EC Law’ (1996) 18 EIPR 271, at 271, 276 [herein-
after: McKnight].
25 E. S. SINGLETON, ‘Intellectual Property Disputes: Settlement Agreements and Ancillary Licences 
under EC and UK Competition Law’ (1993) 15 EIPR 48, at 50 [hereinafter: Singleton].
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The notion of ‘agreement’ is very widely perceived. ‘Agreements, de-
cisions and concerted practices’ referred to in the text of the Treaty in-
clude not only legally enforceable contracts, but also all kinds of informal 
understandings, gentlemen’s agreements, protocols reflecting a genuine 
concurrence of will between parties, conditional or partial agreements 
reached during a bargaining process, as well as guidelines and recom-
mendations by trade associations.26 The provision of art. 81(1) requires 
for an agreement to be prohibited as incompatible with the Common 
Market so that its object or effect are prevention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition. As pointed out in the literature, ‘the object’ in this 
context does not refer to the subjective intention of parties entering into 
agreement, but to the objective meaning and purpose of an agreement 
considered in its economic framework.27  If an agreement does not have 
as its object the restriction of competition, it must have an anti-compe-
titive effect to infringe art. 81(1). This effect is understood broadly, to 
be precise, an actual or potential, direct or indirect effect on inter-state 
trade is taken into consideration.28 The Court of First Instance in one of 
its decisions clarified that assessment of an agreement under art. 81(1) 
cannot be done in isolation, but it requires consideration of the actual 
conditions in which it functions, like the economic and legal context, 
products and services covered by the agreement as well as the structure 
of the market, unless there are clauses containing obvious restrictions of 
competition such as price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of out-
lets.29
An infringement may be found only when an agreement appreciably 
restricts competition, i.e. when it has an appreciable effect on trade bet-
ween Member States, given that art. 81(1) does not apply to agreements 
of minor importance (de minimis doctrine).30 The Court of Justice stated 
that an agreement falls outside the scope of application of art. 81(1), if it 
has an insignificant effect on the market; an insignificant effect is asses-
sed on the basis of the weak position which the entity concerned has on 
the market of the product in question.31 The more precise guidance on 
the agreements on minor importance may be found in the Commission 
26 R. WHISH, Competition Law, 4th Ed. (Butterworths, 2001), at 76 [hereinafter: Whish (2001)]. 
27 Ibidem, at 92-93.
28 R. WHISH, European Union Competition Law: An Introduction (EDRC Information Paper, Uni-
versity of Malta, 1994), at 5 
29 European Night Services, Ltd. v. Commission, Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-
388/94, [1998] ECR 3141.
30 WHISH (2001), at 93-94.
31 Volk v. Vervaecke, Case 5/69 [1969] ECR 295.
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Notice on agreements of minor importance32, which does not have a legally 
binding effect, but may help as an indicator of possible resolutions by the 
Commission. 
Another aspect is the delimitation of the term ‘undertaking’. The Eu-
ropean jurisprudence provides that ‘the concept of an undertaking en-
compasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed’33. The notion 
is very broad, and includes companies, partnerships, state owned corpo-
rations, agricultural cooperatives, public authorities, bodies entrusted by 
the state with particular tasks, trade associations, as well as individuals 
and members of the liberal professions.34 The absence of a profit motive 
or of an economic purpose of an undertaking does not disqualify it with 
respect to application of art. 81, as long as it carries on some commercial 
or economic activity. However, the provision in question has no applica-
tion to agreements between such undertakings which form a single eco-
nomic entity, even though they have separate legal personality (i.e. firms 
within the same corporate group, a parent and subsidiary companies).35
Art. 81(2) provides that any agreement which is prohibited as anti-
competitive is automatically void. Then comes an exemption to the pro-
hibition of art. 81(1), which can be declared inapplicable under certain 
conditions specified in art. 81(3). The declaration of inapplicability of 
art. 81(1) is granted by the Commission in the form of an ‘individual 
exemption’ for a particular agreement or by way of passing a regulation 
which specifies conditions for the ‘block exemption’.36 An agreement 
may benefit from the exemption provided by art. 81(3), if it fulfils all 
four conditions described therein. First, an agreement must contribute 
to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress. Second, an agreement must allow con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. At the same time, an arrange-
ment must be consistent with the principle of proportionality, and can-
not impose on the undertakings restrictions which are not indispensable 
to attain its objectives. Finally, an arrangement may not contribute to 
the elimination of competition in respect of a substantial part of the re-
32 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competi-
tion under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis), O. J. C 368, 
22/12/2001, p. 13.
33 Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90 [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21.
34 WHISH (2001), at 67-68.
35 Ibidem, at 67, 72.
36 Ibidem, at 123.
Trademark licensing agreements in light of the EC competition rules  199
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá I (2008) 189-215
levant products. Further detailed clarification on the conditions of art. 
81(3) and their application is provided in the Commission Guidelines on 
the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty.37
In the light of the above, trademark licensing agreements may well 
fall within the scope of the competition provisions of the Treaty, as far 
as they fulfil the above requirements. For that reason, they are subject 
to control by the relevant European and national institutions. It should 
also be remembered that trademark licensing is in practice often com-
bined with licensing of other intellectual property rights (i.e. patent, 
know-how) and for that reason it can be dependent on the right it goes 
together with. 
Part II
2.  Individual contractual clauses within the prohibition of art. 81(1) 
EEC Treaty
Nowadays, it is no longer in question that the grant of a licence in-
creases competition; this instrument allows a licensee to enter the market, 
a licensee who might not be there at all without the licence.38 Although 
competition law is not less interested in promoting research, innovation 
and development, than intellectual property law is39, it still essentially 
aims at safeguarding the single market against division which may re-
sult from the misuse of the IP rights. This part examines the most com-
mon clauses that parties insert into their trademark licensing contracts 
and which may potentially create the distortion of competition. While 
agreements which include contractual restrictions do not automatically 
result in restricting competition and it depends upon specific circums-
tances whether an agreement satisfies the conditions of art. 81(1), there 
are nonetheless certain clauses which, not being essential for trademark 
protection, are deemed to be anticompetitive per se (such as price-fixing 
or restrictions with respect to customers40).
37 Communication from the Commission – Notice – Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty, O.J. C101, 27/04/2004, p.97.
38 WHISH (2001), at 677; A. G. DIMAS, The Web of the EU’s Intellectual Property, Free Movement of 
Goods and Competition Rules (Sakkoulas/ Bruylant, 1997), at 63 [hereinafter: Dimas].
39 WHISH (2001), at 676. 
40 D.G. GOYDER, EC Competition Law, 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), at 292-293 [here-
inafter: Goyder]. 
200 Agnieszka A. Machnicka
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá I (2008) 189-215
2.1. Territorial protection, exclusive licensing
2.1.1. Exclusivity in trademark licensing – general remarks
Territorial exclusivity constitutes one of the most controversial as-
pects of intellectual property licensing. On the one side, there is a strong 
policy against isolation of national markets and partitioning of the Com-
mon Market. The other side of the problem lies in the protection of the 
party who takes a risk by investing into an uncertain undertaking.
It is a common practice that the licensor gives the licensee an exclu-
sive right to manufacture and to sell the products in a given territory and 
there are different levels of such exclusivity. A ‘sole’ licence is granted if 
the licensor promises not to give similar rights to anyone else but to the 
licensee over the same territory, while the licensor himself retains the 
right to produce and to sell the goods in the given area.41 By an ‘exclusi-
ve’ licence, the licensor additionally agrees not to manufacture himself 
the goods in the licensee’s territory. However, if the licensor promises to 
prohibit other licensees and their customers from selling the goods into 
the licensed territory, he creates an ‘absolute’ territorial protection.42
It is interesting to observe the evolution of the Commission’s posi-
tion towards the exclusivity arrangements. At present, while the grant of 
territorial exclusivity does not by itself generate the prohibition of art. 
81(1), an absolute territorial exclusivity very likely amounts to an infrin-
gement of the provision in question. Nonetheless, such thinking has not 
always been the rule. In Re Velcro/Aplix43, the Commission held that the 
exclusive licences could escape the prohibition of art. 81(1) only if they 
concerned the introduction and protection of a new technology.
Also, in its decision in Re The Agreements of Davide Campari-Mila-
no SpA44 the Commission stated that as a rule ‘an exclusive trademark 
licence is a restriction of competition under Article 81(1)EEC’. The 
Commission further explained in this case the reasons for such finding, 
namely the exclusive right given to the licensees prevented the licensor 
from concluding licensing contracts with other parties, it prevented him 
from manufacturing those products and by the same token made him 
lose his freedom and the gains coming from the competitive activity.45 
Although, according to the Commission, such was the rule, it eventually 
41 WHISH (2001), op. cit., at 678.
42 Ibidem.
43 (1985) O.J. L 233/22.
44 Case 78/253, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 397 [hereinafter: Campari].
45 Ibidem, at 406.
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exempted the said agreements (entered into by Davide Campari-Milano 
SpA and the respective parties in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Bel-
gium, Luxemburg and Denmark), as fulfilling the conditions set in art. 
81(3). The agreements by which Campari-Milano granted its licensees 
an exclusive right to use its trademark for the manufacture of its aperitifs 
and for their sale in specific territories, and at the same time undertook 
not to manufacture its aperitifs itself in these territories, contributed to: 
improving the production and distribution of the products, concentra-
ting sales efforts and allowing to develop existing plants as well as to built 
new plants by each licensee; it also provided better supply to consumers 
in their territories.46
Currently, several legislative acts contain express provisions as to the 
admissibility of exclusive licensing. To begin with, the trademark harmo-
nization directive (89/104/EEC)47 provides in art. 8(1) that a licence 
may be exclusive or non-exclusive. The same provision is found in the 
Community trademark regulation48. The latter act precises that a Com-
munity trademark may be licensed for the whole or part of the Commu-
nity. 
There is no doubt today as to legality of the exclusivity as such in a 
trademark licensing agreement. To the contrary, some authors suggest 
that exclusivity in licensing of trademarks is closely related to intrinsic 
and traditional role of these signs, namely indication of origin of pro-
ducts. It is argued that to safeguard the source indication function of a 
trademark, non-exclusive licence should be limited to situations where 
there is assured an active contribution of the mark owner to the produc-
tion by the licensees, be it in the form of supply of particular products or 
the right to control the manufacture of licensees in order to assure the 
necessary uniformity of production process.49
To find out whether particular territorial protection amounts to in-
fringement of art. 81(1), it is necessary to examine the effects it would 
have on the market. Therefore, each situation needs to be considered in 
the light of all the accompanying circumstances. 
46 Ibidem, at 400, 410-411.
47 O.J. L 40, 11/02/1989, p. 1.
48 O.J. L 11, 14/01/1994, p. 1.
49 G. SENA, Il diritto dei marchi. Marchio nazionale e marchio comunitario, 4 ed. (Giuffrè Editore, 
2007), at 172.
202 Agnieszka A. Machnicka
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá I (2008) 189-215
2.1.2.  Specific circumstances as a basis for infringement of competition rules
The analysis of the Commission’s decisions regarding trademark li-
censing agreements demonstrates how specific circumstances are being 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. A good illustration can be found in the 
decision Moosehead/ Whitbread50. The decision concerned the agree-
ment upon which Moosehead (Canadian brewer) granted to Whitbread 
(British brewer) the sole and exclusive right to produce and promote, 
market and sell beer manufactured under the trademark ‘Moosehead’ in 
the licensed territory, using Moosehead’s secret know-how. In order to 
ascertain whether the agreement falls within art. 81, it is not enough 
to consider its sole wording. At the outset of its analysis the Commis-
sion stated that the exclusive trademark licence for the production and 
marketing of beer and prohibition of active sales outside the specific te-
rritory infringes art. 81(1), since it excludes third parties (i.e. five other 
large brewers in the United Kingdom) from the use as licensees of the 
Moosehead trademark, as well as it restricts Whitebread from selling the 
product in other markets within the Common Market.51 However, con-
sideration of specific characteristics of the United Kingdom beer market 
leads the Commission to the exemption of the agreement in question on 
the basis of art. 81(3). These particularities of the UK beer market are 
as follows: most beer in the UK is sold in public houses licensed for the 
consumption of liquor; in order to achieve substantial sales of a new beer 
it is necessary for the seller to have access to a number of public houses; 
however the majority of these public houses are bound by contract to 
purchase beer from one brewer alone; it is therefore very important for a 
foreign brewer to get the assistance of a large national brewer in order to 
enter the United Kingdom market.52 In light of the above, the agreement 
between Moosehead and Whitbread contributes to the improvement 
of the production and distribution of beer, because the product need 
no longer be imported from Canada, which reduces transport costs, in 
addition it will benefit from Whitebread’s distribution network, and 
also will give consumers a wide choice of products.53
The same line of reasoning was presented by the Commission in its 
previous decision in Re Carlsberg Beer54. Here, the agreement between 
50 Commission Decision of 23 March 1990 (90/ 186/ EEC), O.J. L 100/ 32, 20/04/1990 [hereinafter: 
Moosehead/ Whitbread].
51 Ibidem, at 35.
52 Ibidem, at 33.
53 Ibidem, at 36-37.
54 [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 305; [1984] O.J. C 27/4, 02/02/1984.
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De forenede Bryggerier A/S Copenhagen (Carlsberg) and its United 
Kingdom subsidiary was a part of long-standing cooperation arrange-
ments, on the basis of which both parties were to develop the produc-
tion and sale of Carlsberg brand lager beers in the United Kingdom. 
The Commission acknowledged that ‘with the British beer market do-
minated by a small number of large groups, it is virtually impossible for 
a foreign brewery to enter this market without the certainty of being 
able to sell its products through the distribution network of one of large 
groups’.55
Another aspect has been considered in the decision Re the ‘Tyler’ 
Trade Mark56. Here, the Commission concluded that the grant of an ex-
clusive trademark licence to last for 10 years in a Member State constitu-
ted protection against competition from the grantor or his licensees for 
an ‘unreasonable length of time’57.
A further interesting example is given by the case of Hershey/ Hers-
chi58. The matter concerned the trademark settlement, which were to end 
an ongoing litigation between Hershey Foods Corporation (a large U.S. 
chocolate manufacture famous for its Hershey trademark throughout 
the world) and Schiffers Onroerend Goed Exploitatie BV (Dutch com-
pany producing soft and other drinks) over the right to use the ‘Herschi’ 
trademark for certain food products by the latter. Both trademarks were 
of independent origin. The settlement provided that Schiffers assigns its 
‘Herschi’ trademark to Hershey for valuable consideration, and Hershey 
licenses to Schiffers this trademark to be used on an exclusive basis for 
five years for a defined group of products (the licence may be renewed 
at the request of the licensee). Schiffers agrees not to introduce new 
products in association with the trademark. The positive attitude of the 
Commission towards the agreement in question lies in the fact that it 
is to resolve the problem of confusion of the trademark and at the same 
time it does not partition the Common Market on territorial lines.
55 [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 305.
56 [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 613.
57 Ibidem.
58 [1990] 3 ECLR, R-86.
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2.1.3. Policy considerations with regard to exclusive licensing
While the decisions rendered by the Commission reflect the existing 
provisions and in a sense draw the line for the development of the rules 
regarding competition, in fact it is what the European Court of Justice 
delivers that constitute the actual and comprehensive strategy of the 
European Union in the area in question. Not only the decisions of the 
Commission can be overruled by those of the Court, but as the ECJ case 
law demonstrates, the judicial authority tends to give the thorough justi-
fication and general policy considerations for a chosen attitude towards 
the licensing agreements in conjunction with the competition rules.
In its early case law, the European Court of Justice clearly stated that 
an agreement, which confers an absolute territorial protection on a dis-
tributor, restricts competition and is not eligible for exemption under 
art. 81(3) – Consten and Grundig v. Commission59. It was held in this case 
that the agreement between the licensor (Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH) and 
the licensee (Établissement Consten) for the sole distribution of goods 
(i.e. radio receivers, recorders, televisions, as well as their spare parts and 
accessories) in the French territory attempted to isolate the French mar-
ket for Grundig products and to artificially maintain separate national 
markets within the community. Territorial protection granted to the li-
censee - contrary to the Treaty - was to control and to prevent parallel 
imports.
The decision in Consten and Grundig should not be perceived as a 
strict approach represented by the Court in the 60’s. In the same period 
of time, in Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm60 the Court 
admitted that a clause granting exclusivity on a distributor may escape 
from the prohibition of art. 81(1), if it is absolutely necessary for the 
penetration of a new area by an undertaking, and which at the same time 
does not affect the freedom of third parties through imposing export 
bans and preventing parallel trade.
Then, the decision in Nungesser KG v. Commission61, although not 
relating to the trademark licensing, contains several important remarks, 
that may apply not only to the licensing of a plant breeder’s rights, as was 
the case here, but also to licensing of other intellectual property rights. 
First, the Court gives a definition of ‘an open exclusive licence’ and ‘ab-
solute territorial protection’, clarifying that the former is not in itself in-
59 Cases 56 and 58/64, [1966] ECR 299 [hereinafter: Consten and Grundig].
60 Case 56/65, [1966] ECR 235; W H I S H (2001), at 100.
61 Case 258/78, [1982] ECR 2015 [hereinafter: Nungesser].
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compatible with art. 81(1) EEC Treaty, but the latter – eliminating all 
competition from third parties and resulting in artificial maintenance of 
separate national markets – is contrary to the Treaty.62 In addition, the 
court admits that specific nature of products (i.e. whose growth is very 
complicated and whose reproduction depends on the hazards of climate 
and soil) may justify the stronger protection of the licensee, especially in 
cases where considerable financial commitment is made to achieve the 
risky results. The analysis of the court has a broader application; it is sug-
gested by the court itself, saying that many other products forming the 
subject-matter of a trademark or a patent, are in a similar situation as the 
seeds in question.63 Therefore, the majority of the court’s argumentation 
can be applied to trademark licensing so long as its subject-matter pos-
sess special characteristics that justify the grant of a territorial exclusivity. 
A commentary on the essence of this decision points out that exclusive 
licence may escape prohibition of art. 81(1), ‘if in view of the pioneering 
character of the technology licensed and the risks associated with its in-
troduction on the geographical market covered by the licence, the exclu-
sivity of the licence is warranted as a matter of encouraging the diffusion 
of the new technology over the entire Common Market by competing 
with existing substitutes’64. The same reasoning could possibly apply to 
the licence of a trademark which does not possess yet a significant repu-
tation in a given market and therefore investment of the licensee involves 
his considerable risk.
The analysed case law demonstrates that the infringement of art. 
81(1) is an empirical matter65, and therefore every agreement should be 
assessed in its particular economic and market background. The need to 
protect the parties to an agreement, their rights (licensor) and invest-
ment (licensee) may justify certain restrictions, provided such restric-
tions are properly limited ‘in time, space and subject-matter’66.
For a more complete picture of the matter in question, it should be 
mentioned that trademark delimitation agreements may also adopt cer-
tain restrictions, which makes them capable of infringing competition 
law provisions. These restrictions usually are of two different kinds. First, 
they may limit the territories in which a company is allowed to use its 
trademark. Second, they may restrain a company from using on a specific 
62 Ibidem.
63 Ibidem, para 35.
64 ULLRICH, op. cit., at 605-606.
65 WHISH (2001), at 101.
66 Ibidem, at 100-101.
206 Agnieszka A. Machnicka
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá I (2008) 189-215
kind of product the trademark which it has established for other kinds 
of product.67 If such provisions constrain a party to the extent that is 
greater than necessary, they fall within the scope of art. 81(1). In particu-
lar, they cannot lead to the geographical partitioning of markets. As the 
Commission held in BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v. Commission68, 
delimitation agreements are lawful as long as they serve to delimit the 
spheres in which the parties’ respective trademarks may be used, but they 
are not allowed if they aim at dividing the market or restricting competi-
tion in other ways.
2.1.4. Legal effects of exclusivity
It is important to remember, that trademark licensing agreements 
like any other kind of contracts cannot create obligations for anyone else, 
but for their parties (legal effects inter partes only, but not erga omnes). 
Therefore, also provisions granting exclusivity for the parties do not have 
an effect to restrict the third parties from exercising the rights, which 
are guaranteed by the legal system itself. Parties to the licensing arran-
gements, who break their obligations as to territorial manufacturing 
restrictions or sale restrictions may be liable for the breach of contract. 
However, the proprietor of a trademark may also invoke his rights con-
ferred by the trademark against the licensee who violates any provision 
in the licensing contract, including the obligation as to the territory in 
which a trademark may be affixed (art. 8(2) of the trademark directive, 
and art. 22(2) of the Community trademark regulation). This extended 
protection for trademark owners (a trademark infringement action, ins-
tead of a simple breach of contract action) proves the importance bes-
towed upon industrial property rights within the European system.
On the other hand, the principle of exhaustion of rights (adopted in 
art. 7 of the trademark directive) places a barrier on the unlimited pro-
tection that trademark rights may give to their holders. This concept per-
mits a third party to purchase a product, which was put on the market in 
the Community under the trademark by the proprietor or with his con-
sent, and to sell it on any market a third party wishes.69 The proprietor of 
a trademark may not oppose such a sale by invoking the infringement of 
his trademark rights, he cannot prevent the subsequent free circulation 
of the product. He can only oppose such further commercialisation of 
67 McKNIGHT, op. cit., at 278; SINGLETON, op. cit., at 50.
68 Case 35/83, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 470.
69 WALSH, TREACY & FEASTER, op. cit., at 259.
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goods, if there exist legitimate reasons (art. 7(2)), for example when in 
specific circumstances the given use of a trademark seriously damages the 
reputation of the mark (Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora70).
2.2. Quality control, manufacturing and marketing of product
A very interesting observation was made in the American literature 
at the beginning of the 20th century, which subsequently adopted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court acquired its practical merit for the domain of 
trademarks. F. I. Schechter claims that consumers develop a mental as-
sociation between the trademark and the product, and not between the 
trademark and the producer; it is psychological association of the trade-
mark and the product, that inspires customers to purchase given goods.71 
This phenomenon may be due to the fact that nowadays, the expansion 
of merchandising, where the mark is used by a number of licensees, has 
turned attention from the mark as ‘identifier of source of the goods’ to 
the mark as ‘the essence of the goods themselves’.72 It illustrates the im-
portance of these features of products that consumers appreciate and get 
used to, as well as the significance of the constant maintenance of their 
quality.
One of the aspects of trademark protection is a recognition of the 
significance of their owner’s investment into the quality and presentation 
of the product.73 They enable a manufacturer, who produces high quality 
goods, to expand his reputation from one market to another without 
the need to start from the outset each time he wishes to enter into a 
new area.74 Trademarks encourage their owners to maintain and impro-
ve the quality of products sold under the mark, because of their capacity 
and power to create transparency of goods available to consumers in the 
market place. By the same token, they stimulate economic progress.75 All 
these objectives continue to matter also after the right to use a trademark 
has been licensed. Such a conclusion is allowed in light of the provision 
70 Case C-337/95, (1998) 1 C.M.L.R. 737.
71 F. I. SCHECHTER, ‘The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection’ (1927) 40 Harvard Law Review 
813, at 822 [hereinafter: Schechter]; W. T. VUK, ‘Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the Eu-
ropean Union Should Revise the 1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trade-
marks’ (1998) 21 Fordham International Law Journal 861, at 875 [hereinafter: Vuk] at 918. 
72 N. J. WILKOF, ‘Same Old Tricks or Something New? A View of Trade Mark Licensing and Quality 
Control’ (1996) 5 EIPR 261, at 267 [hereinafter: Wilkof ]. 
73 PICKERING, op. cit., at 157.
74 GOYDER, op. cit., at 290.
75 Introduction to Intellectual Property…, op. cit., at 183.
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of art. 15(3) of the Community trademark regulation, saying that the 
use of a trademark with the consent of the proprietor shall be deemed to 
constitute use by the proprietor himself.
It is a natural consequence that in case of trademark licensing serious 
problems can arise with respect to the consistency of quality of products 
and, as a result, there is a risk of consumer deception.76 Trademarks, re-
flecting the quality of the goods, accustom consumers to a certain level 
of quality, make consumers to expect the same products’ characteristics 
as those of goods previously purchased.77 In addition to the consumer 
protection aspect, the quality maintenance is equally essential for safe-
guarding the trademark holders’ good will and commercial image. The-
refore, it should not be surprising that the quality control is an impor-
tant matter to be decided upon in the licensing agreement. Monitoring 
of quality is particularly essential with respect to trademark licensing, 
since unlike the distributor who only sells goods finished by others, the 
licensee is responsible for their manufacture, selection and distribution. 
Consequently, the licensee becomes ‘the alter ego of the licensor vis-à-vis 
third parties with respect to the use of the mark’78. For that reason, an 
important degree of control over the licensee is justified and desirable. 
The importance of quality control in trademark licensing is fully ac-
knowledged by the Commission. In the Campari decision, the clauses 
restricting manufacture of the product only to the plants capable of gua-
ranteeing its quality, as well as the obligation on licensees to follow the 
licensor’s instructions relating to the manufacture and the quality of the 
ingredients were found to be compatible with art. 81(1). It is interes-
ting to note, that while the Commission found territorial protection and 
obligations on licensees not to handle competing products for the dura-
tion of the licensing agreement to restrict competition within art. 81(1), 
and on the basis of specific nature of products granted the exemption 
provided in art. 81(3), at the same time it rightly considered the restric-
tions arising out of quality of products not to be covered by the said 
provision. However, the obligation on the licensees to supply to certain 
customers (namely: diplomatic customers, ships’ victuallers, foreign ar-
med forces, and other organizations with duty-free facilities) not their 
own product, but the original product of the licensor himself was found 
to restrict competition. This clause, justified by the marketing reasons 
76 KAMPERMAN, op. cit., at 413.
77 VUK, op. cit., at 875.
78 WILKOF, op. cit., at 264. 
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and maintenance of the same original taste for the product being served 
to customers usually required to move frequently from one territory to 
another, was subsequently exempted on the basis of art. 81(3).
The same reasoning was adopted in case of Moosehead/Whitbread, 
where the British licensee agreed to comply with the Canadian licensor’s 
specifications with regard to the quality of beer as well as with the type 
and quality of the raw materials.
In light of these decisions it seems justified to say, that quality con-
trol and restrictions relating to maintenance of the same characteristics 
of products are usually compatible with the rules on competition. Howe-
ver, such restrictions should respect the principle of proportionality, be-
cause - as pointed out in the Campari case - control measures should not 
go beyond a legitimate concern for quality control.
Usually, trademark licensing contracts impose upon licensees not 
only the manufacturing standards, but also the right of the licensor to 
examine samples of products and to inspect the licensee’s manufacturing 
facilities.79 Although such obligations restrict the licensee’s freedom, 
they do not fall into the prohibition of art. 81(1), since they guarantee 
the uniformity and quality of products; it seems unlikely that a trade-
mark holder would license his right without such clauses.
Licensee may also be bound to achieve a certain level of sales, the 
failure to do so may result in termination of a contract. Moreover, he 
might be obliged to spend a minimum amount on advertising the pro-
duct, and the advertising is usually subject to the control by the licensor. 
All these provisions do not create any harm for the competition on the 
market, and therefore escape the prohibition of art. 81(1).80
It was held in IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Stan-
dard GmbH81 that one of the decisive factors in a licence contract is the 
possibility of control over the quality of goods by the licensor, and not 
the actual exercise of that control. In view of that, if a licensor wants to 
oppose importation of the licensee’s products on grounds of poor quali-
ty, such action would not be allowed as contrary to art. 30 and 36 of the 
EC Treaty. The rationale behind this solution is that a licensor must bear 
responsibility, if he tolerates the manufacture of poor quality products, 
despite having contractual means of preventing it. The opposite view, ex-
pressed by some authors who claim that the Court’s position represents 
79 JOLIET, op. cit., at 775.
80 Ibidem, at 785.
81 Case C – 9/93, (1994) 3 C.M.L.R. 857.
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an ‘unduly strict enforcement of Community law’ and that ‘Community 
law continues to disregard the trademark right holder’s legitimate inter-
est in protecting its marketing strategy, and instead encourages parallel 
importers to interfere with distribution systems’82, does not seem to be 
proper. It is perfectly right to put a responsibility for the quality differen-
ces between products bearing the same mark on a producer or a group 
of producers, since they are in a position to avoid it. It is all the more 
appropriate, if such differences are intentional. If a producer purposely 
manufactures goods having different quality according to their destina-
tion, such quality differentiation leads to some kind of partitioning of 
markets, and should be deemed as contrary to certain moral standards in 
commerce. Therefore, it is right to say, that the Court’s standing, not so 
strict though, is just; not only it prevents the partitioning of markets, but 
it also aims at protecting consumers’ interest.
2.3. Tie-in clauses
Closely related to the quality control are obligations on the licensee 
to buy exclusively from the licensor certain products or specific materials 
necessary for the exploitation of the licensed technology. Such ‘tie-in’ 
clauses are by some commentators regarded to be anticompetitive, since 
they prevent the licensee from acquiring its supplies from other under-
takings, perhaps on more favourable terms.83 Nevertheless, it should be 
remembered that such obligations are frequently the only way to meet 
the prescribed standards of production and they help to achieve the re-
quired quality of products.
The Commission in the Campari decision held that the obligation 
on the licensees to buy certain secret raw materials (secret mixtures of 
herbs and colouring matters) from the licensor was compatible with 
art. 81(1). Similarly, the exclusive purchasing obligation regarding yeast 
(Moosehead/Whitbread) did not fall under the said provision, because it 
was necessary to ensure technically satisfactory exploitation of the licen-
sed technology and an identity between the beer produced originally by 
Moosehead and the product manufactured by Whitbread. It is obvious 
though, that in the same way as in quality control restrictions, tie-in clau-
ses should observe the proportionality principle to avoid confusion with 
the competition rules.
82 REINDL, op. cit., at 820.
83 DIMAS, op. cit., at 72.
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2.4. No-challenge clauses
Sometimes the owner of an industrial property right wishes to in-
clude in a licensing agreement a provision under which the licensee is 
obliged not to challenge the validity of the right in question. The ra-
tionale lying behind such an obligation is that the licensee is in the best 
position to show that a subject-matter of a right lacks certain necessary 
characteristics. 
For a long time, both the Commission and the Court maintained 
that no-challenge clauses are against the public interest and that they res-
trict the licensee’s freedom, and therefore fall under art. 81(1). Such was 
the position in Windsurfing International Inc. v. Commission84, where the 
matter concerned a patent no-challenge clause, and the Commission sta-
ted clearly that a patent licensing agreement may not be used to induce 
the patent licensee to acknowledge the validity of a trademark belonging 
to the licensor.85 As to the validity of a no-challenge clause relating to 
a trademark in a trademark licensing agreement, the Commission held 
that this matter could be left undecided for the purpose of the matters 
being then discussed. The first published decision where the Commis-
sion analyses a no-challenge clause relating to trademarks is Moosehead/
Whitbread, which is after six and a half years after the question was left 
open in its Windsurfing decision.86 It was held, that trademark no-cha-
llenge clauses as such do not automatically fall within the scope of art. 
81(1). Whether or not such obligations violate the provision in question 
depends on the particular economic context. With regard to trademarks, 
a no-challenge clause may constitute an appreciable restriction on com-
petition, if a use of a particular trademark constitute an important ad-
vantage to a company entering or competing in a given market. Since the 
ownership of a trademark only gives the holder the exclusive right to sell 
products under that name, other parties are free to sell the product under 
a different trademark. Only the use of a well-known trademark, which 
constitutes a significant barrier to any other company, may constitute an 
appreciable restriction on competition.87 In a decision in question, be-
cause the trademark ‘Moosehead’ was relatively new in the licensed terri-
tory, its maintenance would not constitute an appreciable barrier for any 
other company to enter or compete in the United Kingdom beer market. 
84 Case 193/83, [1986] ECR 611 [hereinafter: Windsurfing].
85 Ibidem.
86 R. SUBIOTTO, ‘Moosehead/Whitbread: Industrial Franchises and No-Challenge Clauses Relating 
to Licensed Trade Marks under EEC Competition Law’ (1990) 5 E.C.L.R. 226, at 229. 
87 Moosehead/Whitbread, at 36.
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This demonstrates that no-challenge clauses should not be regarded as 
unlawful per se, however a careful consideration should be given to all 
the circumstances, including the situation on a given market. 
3. Conclusion
The examination of relevant case law and literature relating to trade-
mark licensing illustrates, that an ostensible opposition between exclusi-
ve rights, on the one side, and rules protecting undistorted competition 
in the market, on the other can be eliminated. Although certain arran-
gements may intentionally aim at distorting competition, contracts with 
respect to exclusive trademark rights do not conflict per se with compe-
tition rules. 
Recently, it became common in literature to point out that trade-
mark law aims not only at the protection of goodwill and the prevention 
of public confusion, but also at the protection of competition.88 As a 
matter of fact, the efficient competition on the market is guaranteed, 
among other things by the legitimate protection of owners of intellectual 
property rights. Neither of these concepts can exist separately, and their 
proper mutual functioning is an indispensable element of the Common 
Market and consumers’ rights.
Territorial protection of particular parties is one of the core issues 
in trademark licensing agreements. It is very important, that judicial 
authorities recognize its significance and do not consider this concept 
as inherently anti-competitive. Generally, exclusivity is allowed as long 
as it does not appreciably affect the position of third parties, for exam-
ple other potential exclusive licensees for other territories. The case law 
of the European Court of Justice and decisions of the Commission de-
monstrate that every agreement should be analysed in light of all the ac-
companying circumstances and particularities of a given sphere of trade, 
as well as the advantages it produces for a market as a whole. The prin-
ciple of proportionality, the fundamental idea of the European system, 
is applied to assess the legitimacy of particular contractual clauses. One 
should however be aware of several problems which may arise of specific 
contractual arrangements and which were not carefully considered at the 
time of their conclusion; therefore a thorough examination of individual 
88 VUK, op. cit., at 880.
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licensing contracts in light of the existing case law is necessary to avoid 
the infringement of competition rules.
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